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Abstract
In this article, we study the influence of wage differential on the emergence
of endogenous fluctuations. In this way, we introduce a dual labor market, based
on the efficiency wage theory of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), in an overlapping
generations model. We show that wage inequality is a source of endogenous fluc-
tuations. Indeed, a sufficiently strong wage differential leads to the occurrence
of cycles of period two and local indeterminacy. Moreover, in contrast to several
existing contributions, these results depend neither on increasing returns to scale,
nor on the degree of capital-labor substitution.
Keywords: endogenous fluctuations, dual labor market, wage inequality, efficiency
wage.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we focus on the role of labor market imperfections on the emergence
of endogenous fluctuations. More precisely, we analyze the effect of a wage in-
equality on local stability of the steady state and occurrence of bifurcations.
For the last twenty years, a lot of economists have been interested in the emer-
gence of endogenous fluctuations in macroeconomic models.2 However, most of
these authors consider the labor market as perfectly competitive (see for example,
Benhabib and Nishimura (1985, 1998), Grandmont (1985), Grandmont, Pintus,
and de Vilder (1998), Reichlin (1986)). Recently, in some articles, imperfec-
tions in labor market have been introduced. For example, Jacobsen (2000) con-
siders a monetary economy characterized by monopolistic competition on goods
and labor markets. In this model, cycles of period two can emerge in an econ-
omy where involuntary unemployment takes place. Coimbra, Lloyd-Braga, and
Modesto (2004) introduce unions in an overlapping generations model. In an ef-
ficient bargaining framework, these authors conclude that the bargaining power
of unions influences the local indeterminacy and occurrence of endogenous cy-
cles.3 Coimbra (1999) analyzes the effect of the indivisible labor hypothesis on
the emergence of endogenous fluctuations, assuming an efficiency wage on the la-
bor market. He obtains two labor market regularities: employment is more volatile
than real wages and real wages are acyclical.
Nevertheless, in this field of research, the literature has ignored an impor-
tant stylized fact of the labor market, namely the existence of wage differentials.
Indeed, empirical studies of Dickens and Katz (1987), Krueger and Summers
(1987), Katz and Summers (1989), Gibbons and Katz (1992) and Abowd, Kra-
marz, and Margolis (1994) highlight the existence and the persistence of wage
inequalities in most industrialized countries. A lot of factors can explain these
wage differentials, such as the size of the firms, the gender or the union rate.
However, most of these empirical studies show that the existence of wage gaps
between employees results from differences in individual’s characteristics, no-
tably skill. Thus, it seems to be important to take into account a wage inequality,
based on skilled heterogeneity, in a macroeconomic dynamic perspective. New
labor market approaches allow us to explain this wage differential theoretically.
In particular, the dual labor market approach, based on the efficiency wage theory
developed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), provides an explanation to the ratio-
nal existence of wage inequalities (Bulow and Summers (1986), Jones (1987a),
Jones (1987b), Saint-Paul (1996) or Agenor and Aizenman (1997)).4 We thus in-
2For a survey, see Benhabib and Farmer (1999) or Guesnerie and Woodford (1992).
3See also Lloyd-Braga and Modesto (2003) who introduce unions in a model la Woodford
(1986).
4See Akerlof and Yellen (1986), Yellen (1984) or Weiss (1991) for a survey on the efficiency
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troduce this new labor market approach in a dynamic macroeconomic model, in
order to study the influence of wage inequality on the emergence of endogenous
fluctuations.5
In this way, we consider an overlapping generations model with perfect fore-
sight. The production of a unique final good takes place in two sectors, namely
the primary sector and the secondary sector.6 In the primary sector, firms use only
one input, skilled labor, under a constant returns to scale technology. The worker’s
effort being not perfectly observable, the employer sets an above-equilibrium effi-
ciency wage in order to elicit qualified worker from shirking, which is well-known
as the non-shirking condition. In the secondary sector, firms use two inputs, cap-
ital and unskilled labor, under a constant returns to scale technology. Contrary to
the primary sector, worker’s effort is perfectly observable, and so employees earn
a competitive wage.7 The presence of an efficiency wage in the primary sector
leads to a rationed labor supply. Moreover, labor mobility is assumed to be per-
fect. So, unemployment cannot emerge in this dual economy, since the secondary
sector is competitive. Furthermore, a wage differential appears at the equilibrium,
coming not only from skilled heterogeneity, but also from the presence of incen-
tives based on efficiency considerations in the primary sector.
The dynamics of the model are entirely governed by a two-dimensional sys-
tem, which directly depends on the wage structure. In order to analyze this system,
we first show the existence and the uniqueness of the steady state. But the main
result concerns the emergence of endogenous fluctuations due to the existence of
a wage inequality. Indeed, we show that endogenous fluctuations cannot occur
under a weak wage differential. However, when the wage inequality becomes suf-
ficiently high, cycles of period two can appear through the occurrence of a flip
bifurcation and the steady state is locally indeterminate. Hence, we put in light
that wage inequalities are a source of endogenous fluctuations. In other words,
when efficiency considerations play an important role in the primary sector, i.e.
wage theory.
5We can notice that the aim of this paper is not to provide an explanation of the existence of
dual labor market (Albrecht and Vroman (1992), Rebitzer and Taylor (1991), Saint-Paul (1991,
1996), Teulings (1993)) but rather to show implications of such labor market structure on the
dynamic stability. Furthermore, it is important to note that our version of efficiency wage does
not correspond to a dynamic approach of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). Such a field of research has
been explored by Kimball (1994), for instance.
6Contrary to a lot of papers (Benhabib and Farmer (1996), Benhabib and Nishimura
(1985,1998), Boldrin (1989), Galor (1992), Harrison and Weder (2002)), we do not consider a
two-sector model with a consumption good and investment good because we essentially focus our
attention on the role of labor market imperfections.
7As it is argued by Agenor and Aizenman (1997), this kind of labor segmentation can be
interpreted as the coexistence of a services sector assimilated to white collars and an industrial
sector assimilated to blue collars.
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the level of skilled worker effort is relatively high, the non-shirking condition is
a source of cycles. Moreover, contrary to a lot of contributions, our results de-
pend neither on increasing returns to scale, nor on the degree of the capital-labor
substitution (Cazzavillan (2001), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998),
Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), Lloyd-Braga (1995), Reichlin (1986),
Woodford (1986)). More generally, this paper shows that labor market imperfec-
tions can explain fluctuations due to self-fulfilling expectations and endogenous
cycles.
This article is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model. In
section 3, we show the existence and uniqueness of the steady state. In section
4, we analyze the emergence of endogenous fluctuations. Finally, we conclude in
section 5.
2 The Model
In this paper, we consider an overlapping generations model with perfect foresight
and discrete time, t = 1; 2:::1. The population is constant and equals to L. Each
generation lives two periods. In a period t, young consumers born at t and old
consumers born at t  1 live together. Households consume at the two periods of
their life a unique final good which is the numeraire. At the first period of his life,
each young consumer chooses to supply or not one unit of labor and rents capital
to the firms at the real interest rate.
The final good is supplied on a perfectly competitive market. We assume that
two types of technology can produce this good. Each type of technology is as-
similated to a sector called respectively primary and secondary sector. Following
the dual labor market literature (Bulow and Summers (1986), Doeringer and Pi-
ore (1971)), jobs of the primary sector are remunerated at a higher level than in
the secondary sector. In this way, we can notably think of a segmented labor
market characterized by the coexistence of skilled and unskilled workers who re-
spectively belong to primary and secondary sectors. We can consider that the
unskilled workers are more substitute to the physical capital than skilled workers
(Flug and Hercowitz (2000), Koebel, Falk, and Laisney (2002)). Moreover, the
secondary sector where the unskilled workers are employed is the most capital
intensive. That is why in this paper, we consider the limit case where capital is
only used in the secondary sector. Furthermore, the qualified workers are able to
provide a higher level of effort than the unqualified workers.
More precisely in the first sector, the technology is characterized by constant
returns to scale and the firms use an unique input, labor. The firms cannot perfectly
observe the skilled worker’s effort. In order to deter the workers from shirking, an
efficiency wage of the type of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) is set above the com-
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petitive one. Therefore, we observe an excess of labor supply in this sector. In
the secondary sector, the final good is produced using capital and labor. The pro-
duction takes place under constant returns to scale. Moreover, we assume that the
worker’s effort is perfectly observable and so the wage is perfectly competitive.
Furthermore, each generation is composed by skilled workers (L
s
) and unskilled
workers (L
us
), in fixed proportion. The unqualified employees can only work in
the secondary sector, while the qualified employees who do not find a job in the
primary sector, can immediately enter the unqualified sector. This last remark is
based on the fact that the technology in the primary sector requires a higher level
of effort (or qualification) than in the secondary sector. Finally, assuming a perfect
mobility of workers between the two sectors, unemployment cannot occur in this
economy.
2.1 Firms and Labor Market
We first present the primary sector. We assume that the production function can
be written as follows:
Y
1t
(e; L
1t
) = eL
1t
(1)
where Y
1t
denotes the final good product in the primary sector, L
1t
the number of
skilled workers hired in this sector, and e their level of effort. We suppose in the
following that e 2 f0; e
1
g.
We recall that in this sector, firms cannot perfectly observe worker’s effort.
Hence, the employer has to set an efficiency wage so as to deter skilled workers
from shirking and incite them to provide a strictly positive level of effort. Assum-
ing that workers preferences on consumption and effort are separable, the indirect
utility function is given by:
V
t
= H
t
!
t
  ~e (2)
where !
t
denotes the real wage and ~e the level of effort of the worker which
can be equal to 0 or e
1
in the primary sector, and e
2
2 (0; e
1
) in the secondary
sector. Moreover H
t
represents the worker indirect utility of consumption per
unit of wage and we will define it more precisely in the next section. We further
suppose that firms consider H
t
as given at period t. The level of effort will be
strictly positive (~e = e
1
) if the skilled worker is employed in the primary sector
and does not shirk. It will be zero if this worker shirks in the qualified sector
and e
2
if he works in the secondary sector. We assume also that the control rate
of each worker is constant and noted  2 (0; 1). Following Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984], the employer determines the level of wage such that the expected utility
of an employee, who produces the effort, is greater than the expected utility of an
employee who shirks (non-shirking condition):
H
t
!
1t
  e
1
 (1  )H
t
!
1t
+ (H
t
!
2t
  e
2
) (3)
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where !
1t
denotes the real wage in the primary sector and !
2t
the real wage in
the secondary sector. The left hand-side in expression (3) measures the expected
utility derived by a worker who is not shirking and provides a level of effort equal
to e
1
, while the right hand-side measures the expected utility of a shirking worker
as a weighted average of the consumer’utility if it is caught shirking and fired
(with probability ), and if it is not caught (with probability 1 ). In this last case,
the level of effort is zero. We can further notice that a shirking skilled worker, who
is caught, immediately enters the secondary sector and provides the same effort
as an unskilled worker, e
2
. At the equilibrium, the employer sets the wage such
that the employee will be indifferent between shirking and not shirking.8 Using
equation (3), we obtain:
!
1t
  !
2t
=
e
1
  e
2
H
t
(4)
We can note that the non-shirking condition (4) implies the existence of a wage
differential, at the equilibrium. This wage inequality increases with respect to the
qualification gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Indeed, a greater level of
effort in the primary sector constrains the employer to give a higher remuneration
in order to deter skilled workers from shirking. We also remark that an increase of
the probability of getting caught  reduces the wage differential. In other words,
employees provide a strictly positive effort for smaller wages in the primary sector,
when the probability of detected shirking workers rises. Moreover, we notice that
a higher H
t
decreases wage inequality. Indeed, it raises indirect utility per unit
of wage, which reduces the incentive for workers to shirk. Then employers of
the primary sector put the wage at a lower level with respect to the competitive
wage. Finally, we precise that, in contrast to Kimball (1994) who is interested in
dynamics of the Shapiro and Stiglitz efficiency wage, our non-shirking condition
is based on a static version of this last one.
The firms of the primary sector maximize their profits. The first order condi-
tion can be written:
!
1t
= e
1
(5)
In the secondary sector, a continuum of firms of unit mass uses two inputs,
the labor L
2t
and the capital K
t 1
in order to produce the final good. Assuming
constant returns to scale, the production function can be written:
Y
2t
= Bf(k
t
)e
2
L
2t
(6)
where k
t
= K
t 1
=(e
2
L
2t
) is the capital-labor ratio in the secondary sector, f
the intensive production function and B > 0 a scaling parameter. Moreover, we
assume:
8In this case, we consider that the employee decides to produce the positive effort e
1
.
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Assumption 1 The intensive production function f(k) is continuous for k  0,
C
p for k > 0 and p sufficiently high, increasing (f 0(k) > 0) and strictly concave
(f 00(k) < 0).
At each period, firms maximize their profits. So, we can deduce the usual first
order conditions:
r
t
= Bf
0
(k
t
) (7)
!
2t
= Be
2
(f(k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
)) (8)
where r
t
denotes the real interest rate and w
2t
the perfectly competitive wage. We
represent the dual labor market in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Dual labor market
Before presenting the consumption sector, it is convenient to define the follow-
ing relationships. First, we note the capital share in the secondary sector income
s(k) = f
0
(k)k=f(k) 2 (0; 1). Moreover, we also note (k)  0 the elasticity of
capital-labor substitution. Using (7) and (8), 1=(k) = d ln (f(k)  kf 0(k))=d lnk 
d ln f
0
(k)=d lnk. Since, d(f(k)  kf 0(k))=dk =  kf 00(k), we can deduce that:
d ln (f(k)  kf
0
(k))
d lnk
=
s(k)
(k)
(9)
d ln f
0
(k)
d ln k
=  
1  s(k)
(k)
(10)
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2.2 The Consumers
We assume that preferences of a representative household born at t  1 are ad-
ditively separable between consumption and effort. We further suppose Cobb-
Douglas preferences over consumption when young and old, that we respectively
note C
1t
and C
2t+1
. When the individual is young, he supplies one unit of labor.
The labor income is spent in final good or saved through the purchase of capital
e
K
t
. The capital fully depreciates after one period of production. When old, indi-
viduals rent to firms the capital good at the expected rate r
t+1
. At the first period,
a generation of old lives only one period and has the capital stock as unique en-
dowment. Then, the problem solved by the representative consumer born at t  1
is:
max AC
a
1t
C
1 a
2t+1
  ~e (11)
s:t: C
1t
+
e
K
t
= 

t
(12)
C
2t+1
= r
t+1
e
K
t
(13)
where A > 0 is a scaling factor, a 2 (0; 1), ~e 2 f0; e
2
; e
1
g denotes the level
of effort and 

t
is the income of the representative consumer. We derive the
following conditions:
C
1t
= a

t
(14)
C
2t+1
= (1  a)r
t+1


t
(15)
and
e
K
t
= (1  a)

t
(16)
Substituting (14) and (15) into (11), we obtain the indirect utility:
Au(r
t+1
)

t
  ~e (17)
with u(r
t+1
) = a
a
(1  a)
1 a
r
1 a
t+1
. We can note that the relation (17) justifies the
indirect utility used in the non-shirking condition (3). Indeed, the real interest
rate r
t+1
is considered as given by the firm at period t and so we identify H
t
to
Au(r
t+1
). Referring to the previous section, it notably means that a higher r
t+1
which corresponds to a higher H
t
, leads to a weaker wage inequality.
2.3 Intertemporal Equilibrium
In order to determine the intertemporal equilibrium, we begin by given the ex-
pression of the global labor income. Since workers mobility is perfect (L =
L
2t
+ L
1t
=

L
s
+

L
us
), we have:


t

L = !
1t
(

L  L
2t
) + !
2t
L
2t
(18)
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At the equilibrium, L eK
t 1
= K
t 1
is predetermined by the savings of the
previous young generation. Then, substituting (5), (7), (8), (18) into (4) and (16),
we obtain:
K
t
= (1  a)

e
1

L  (e
1
 Be
2
(f(k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
)))
K
t 1
e
2
k
t

(19)
e
1
 Be
2
[f(k
t
)  k
t
f
0
(k
t
)℄ =
e
1
  e
2
Au [Bf
0
(k
t+1
)℄
(20)
Definition 1 An intertemporal equilibrium with perfect foresight is a sequence
(K
t 1
; k
t
) 2 R
2
++
, t = 1; 2; :::1, such that (19) and (20) are satisfied.
The two equations (19) and (20) govern the dynamics of the economy. In-
deed, they determine a two-dimensional dynamic system with one predetermined
variable, the capital. Moreover, we can remark that these two relations directly
depend on the wage and employment structure. More precisely, savings (equa-
tion (19)) is defined by earnings of skilled and unskilled workers and and size of
the two sectors. Equation (20) corresponds to the non-shirking condition which
shows the extend of the wage gap. We notice that this wage inequality does not
only depend on skill heterogeneity, but also negatively on the future interest rate.
3 Steady State Analysis
In this section, we study the existence and uniqueness of the stationary state of
the dynamical system (19) and (20). Our analysis will closely follow Cazzavillan,
Lloyd-Braga, and Pintus (1998) and Aloi, Dixon, and Lloyd-Braga (2000).
A steady state (K; k) is a solution satisfying:
K = (1  a)

e
1

L  (e
1
  Be
2
(f(k)  kf
0
(k)))
K
e
2
k

(21)
e
1
 Be
2
[f(k)  kf
0
(k)℄ =
e
1
  e
2
Au [Bf
0
(k)℄
(22)
Existence is established by scaling the two parameters A and B in order to
normalize the steady state values of capital and capital-labor ratio. In what follows
we ensure the existence of a steady state, namely with K = 1 and k = 1 by
choosing appropriate values of the scaling parameters A > 0 and B > 0 such
that:
A

=
e
1
  e
2

e
1

L 
1
1  a

e
2
u(B

f
0
(1))
(23)
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B
=
1
f(1)  f
0
(1)

1
1  a
  e
1

L+
e
1
e
2

(24)
Considering L > 1=e
2
and under Assumption 1, e
1
has to be included in
(
1
;
2
) to ensure that A and B are strictly positive, where:

1
=
1
(1  a)

L
(25)

2
=
e
2
(1  a)
 
e
2

L  1
 (26)
Furthermore, it is obvious to remark that the steady state is unique. Indeed, the
left-hand-side of (22) is decreasing with respect to k, while the right-hand-side is
increasing with respect to k. We deduce the uniqueness of K from (21).
Proposition 1 Assuming L > 1=e
2
, let e
1
2 (
1
;
2
) where 
1
and 
2
are the
solutions of (25) and (26). Under Assumption 1, if A and B are defined by the
relations (23) and (24), then (K; k) = (1; 1) is the unique stationary solution of
the dynamic system (19) and (20).
We can remark that the condition e
1
> 
1
means that the efficiency wage in
the primary sector is always greater than competitive wage of the secondary sector,
i.e. !
1t
> !
2t
. In other words, we ensure that the level of effort in the primary
sector is such that the non-shirking condition is always relevant. Furthermore, the
inequality e
1
< 
2
implies that the secondary sector wage is strictly positive.
4 Local Dynamics and Bifurcation Analysis
In this section, we analyze the role of wage differential on the emergence of local
endogenous fluctuations. In particular, we show that endogenous fluctuations can
occur only if the wage differential is sufficiently strong. In this way, we study the
local indeterminacy of the steady state and the occurrence of local bifurcations.
So, we first differentiate the dynamic system (19) and (20) in the neighborhood of
the steady state (K; k) = (1; 1). Indeed, from Hartman-Grobman Theorem,9 the
linearized dynamic system is qualitatively analogous to (19) and (20). Using (9)
and (10), we obtain:
9This theorem can be applied if the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state is invertible
and if it has no eigenvalue of modulus one.
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dK
t
=
 
1  e
1

L(1  a)

dK
t 1
+

1 
e
1
e
2
(1  a)(e
2

L  1)

"
s

+
e
2

(1  a)e
1

L  1

e
2
  e
1
(1  a)(e
2

L  1)
#
dk
t
(27)
dk
t+1
=  
s
(1  a)(1  s)
e
2
  e
1
(e
2

L  1)(1  a)
e
2
(e
1

L(1  a)  1)
dk
t
(28)
where s = s(1) and  = (1).
At this stage, we can remark that the wage differential is an increasing function
of the parameter e
1
at the steady state. Indeed, we have:
!
1
  !
2
= e
2

e
1

L 
1
1  a

(29)
Moreover, when e
1
tends to 
1
, !
1
tends to !
2
, and the wage inequality becomes
weak. On the contrary, when e
1
tends to 
2
, !
2
tends to 0, and the wage inequality
is the highest. Most of these remarks allow us to study the influence of the wage
differential on the occurrence of endogenous fluctuations.
Proposition 2 Let e
1F
=
1
1 a
s+(1 a)(1 s)
s(

L 1=e
2
)+(1 s)(1 a)

L
. Assuming L > 2=e
2
, when the
wage inequality is small (e
1
2 (
1
; e
1F
)), the steady state is a saddle. When the
wage differential raises, a flip bifurcation occurs (e
1
= e
1F
) and the steady state
becomes a sink when the wage inequality is sufficiently high (e
1
2 (e
1F
;
2
)).
Proof.
From the relations (27) and (28), we can easily compute the two eigenvalues
of the Jacobian matrix:

1
=
 
1  e
1

L(1  a)
 (30)

2
=  
s
(1  a)(1  s)
e
2
  e
1
(e
2

L  1)(1  a)
e
2
(e
1

L(1  a)  1)
(31)
Since L > 2=e
2
, 
1
2 ( 1; 0). We can notice that 
2
< 0. Furthermore, 
2
is
strictly increasing with respect to e
1
and varies from  1 to 0 when e
1
increases
from 
1
to 
2
. So, there is a unique value e
1F
such that 
1
=  1, with:
e
1F
=
1
1  a
s+ (1  a)(1  s)
s(

L  1=e
2
) + (1  s)(1  a)

L
(32)
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We can conclude that when e
1
< e
1F
, the steady state is a saddle, a flip bifurcation
occurs when e
1
= e
1F
, and the steady state becomes a sink for e
1
> e
1F
.

We can first note that a weak wage inequality (!
2
tends to !
1
) implies that
the steady state is a saddle. Then, endogenous fluctuations cannot emerge in the
model. However, when the wage differential increases, a cycle of period 2 appears
trough the occurrence of a flip bifurcation. Moreover, the steady state equilibrium
is locally indeterminate when the wage inequality is sufficiently high.10 Hence,
endogenous stochastic fluctuations can emerge in the neighborhood of the steady
state. Endogenous stochastic fluctuations can also appear in the neighborhood of
the cycle if it is locally stable, i.e. if the bifurcation is supercritical.11 These results
mean that under constant returns to scale, endogenous stochastic and deterministic
fluctuations can emerge if the wage inequality is strong enough.
Before explaining these economic features, we recall that the extent of the
wage differential depends on the skill gap between qualified and unqualified work-
ers and on the incentives to deter skilled workers from shirking. Furthermore, in
our dynamic framework, this wage inequality is also negatively correlated to the
level of future interest rate. Indeed, a higher level of the interest rate raises more
the indirect utility of a worker employed in the primary sector than if it is hired in
the secondary sector. So, it reduces the worker incentive to shirk. In other words,
a higher interest rate increases the cost of being fired in the primary sector. Then,
the skilled worker will not shirk for a weaker wage differential.
We can now give a more intuitive explanation of the emergence of endogenous
fluctuations in this model. In what follows, we first present why a sufficiently
high wage differential promotes the occurrence of indeterminacy and endogenous
cycles. Secondly, we highlight the dynamics around the cycle.
In order to show what the main mechanism is which generates indeterminacy
and endogenous cycles, we can rewrite the dynamic system (19) and (20) as:
w
1t
  w
2t
=
e
1
  e
2
Au(r
t+1
)
(33)
K
t
= (1  a)[w
1t

L  (w
1t
  w
2t
)L
2t
℄ (34)
We can easily remark that capital accumulation is strongly correlated to the wage
structure. More precisely, in the case of a small wage inequality, due for instance
to a small skill gap, the second term in the brackets in equation (34) becomes ar-
bitrarily small. So, capital accumulation mainly depends on a constant term w
1t

L.
10We recall that the steady state is locally indeterminate if it is locally stable (sink) because the
capital is predetermined.
11For more details, see Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998) and Guesnerie and Woodford
(1992).
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On the contrary, when the wage differential is relatively high, it strongly affects
the aggregate savings K
t
. Since wage inequality is decreasing with respect to
expected interest rate (equation (33)), a variation of this interest rate, yielding a
modification of wage differential, implies a large variability of capital accumula-
tion only when the wage inequality is strong enough.
Taking into account that wage inequality is sufficiently high to generate an
endogenous cycle, we now give a more detailed explanation of the evolution of
the variables around the cycle. To do that, consider that one deviates from the
steady state following an increase of the future expected interest rate. Through the
non shirking condition (33), wage inequality is weaker. Since the efficiency wage
is constant, it means that the competitive wage becomes higher and then labor in
the secondary sector decreases. From equation (34), this leads to a greater level of
capital. So future interest rate increases, and expectations are self-fulfilling, only
if the labor in the secondary sector raises at the next period (L
2t+1
). This more
important size of the secondary sector reduces the competitive wage in this sector,
and raises the wage inequality at the next period. These last effects negatively
influence savings and then capital accumulation at the following period (K
t+1
).
These elements clearly explain what happens around a cycle.
It is important to notice that our results do not require increasing returns to
scale and the existence of externalities as it has often been shown by a large litera-
ture (Benhabib and Farmer (1994), Cazzavillan (2001), Cazzavillan, Lloyd-Braga,
and Pintus (1998) or Lloyd-Braga (1995)). Furthermore, we can notice that the
conditions for the emergence of endogenous fluctuations do not depend on the
elasticity of capital-labor substitution. So, contrary to a lot of existing contri-
butions (Reichlin (1986), Grandmont, Pintus, and de Vilder (1998), Woodford
(1986)), local indeterminacy and deterministic cycles can appear for all values
of this elasticity. Finally, using equation (32), we can easily see that e
1F
is an
increasing function of s. Hence, a smaller capital share in the secondary sector
income promotes the occurrence of local indeterminacy.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider a dual labor market, based on Shapiro and Stiglitz
[1984] efficiency wage, in an overlapping generations model. The introduction
of such labor market imperfection leads to a wage differential at the equilibrium.
In this framework, we show that a sufficiently strong wage inequality promotes
the emergence of endogenous fluctuations. Moreover, our results depend neither
on increasing returns to scale, nor on the degree of capital-labor substitution. So,
this article shows more generally that the introduction of new labor market ap-
proaches play an important role on the emergence of endogenous fluctuations. Fu-
15
ture researches have to take into account other labor market specifications (unions,
matching...) in order to study their influence on the occurrence of endogenous
fluctuations.
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